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In recent years, the issue of medical malpractice has been prominent in
political campaigns' and state legislative sessions. 2 A number of statesresponding to a perceived "medical malpractice crisis"-have enacted
sweeping reforms of the medical malpractice litigation process.
Much of this debate, however, has been devoid of reference to hard
evidence. Assertions about the existence--or absence-of a malpractice
crisis are often made based on anecdotal evidence describing the experience
of a particular doctor, patient, or lawyer. Similarly, policy reforms are
touted without reference to their demonstrated real-world effects.
This is unfortunate. The importance of the medical malpractice debate
cannot be understated. It is also surprising, given the emergence of a strong
body of empirical literature4 on medical malpractice and tort reform,5 and
the availability of a number of data sets applicable to questions that
commonly arise in discussions of malpractice litigation and tort reform.6
This paper offers a critical literature review of recent work in the area
in order to bring the evidence center-stage in the policy debate. The paper
is divided into two sections. In Part I, I briefly address the role of empirical
legal scholarship and set forth rubrics under which the empirical literature
on malpractice and tort reform can be judged. In Part II, I apply those
rubrics to recent empirical work on medical malpractice and tort reform. I
divide Part I into subsections, considering, in turn, the empirical literature
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I.
See Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in
Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPRICAL LEG. STUD. 207, 207 (2005).

2.
See Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, EmpiricalResearch and Civil Jury
Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1497 (2003).
3.

See Albert Yoon, Mandatory Arbitration and Civil Litigation: An Empirical

Study of Medical MalpracticeLitigation in the West, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95, 96 (2004).
4.
By empirical, I do mean to describe the "narrow" concept of "'statistical
techniques and analyses,' or quantitative data," rather than the broader concern with "basing
conclusions on observation or experimentation-and inference-using facts we know to
learn about facts we do not know." Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U.
Cm. L. REV. 1, 2 (2002).
5.
This literature is part of a general increase in both the supply of and demand for
empirical legal scholarship. See Gregory Mitchell, Essay, Empirical Legal Scholarship as
Scientific Dialogue, 83 N.C. L. REV. 167, 204 (2004).
6.
See, e.g., Mark A. Hall et al., Measuring Medical MalpracticePatterns:Sources
of Evidence from Health Services Research, 37 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 779, 820 (2000)
("[Tihe large and growing field of health services research offers many research techniques,
sources of data, and skilled researchers for deriving medical standards of care from empirical
sources.").
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on medical error and medical malpractice itself, the medical malpractice
litigation process, and finally medical malpractice tort reform.
I. THE VALUE OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

The role of empirical scholarship in law has recently been subjected to
considerable attention in the Academy. The subject of this year's American
Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting in January was "Empirical
Scholarship: What Should We Study and How Should We Study It?"'7 This
conference topic followed a series of lively exchanges in 2002 in the
University of Chicago Law Review regarding the role of empirical work in
legal studies 8 and a 2001 symposium organized by the University of Illinois
Law Review. 9 Perhaps the best sign of the rising attention given to
empirical legal scholarship is that one professor recently released an
empirical study ranking law schools according to their output of empirical
legal scholarship.10
While commentators on empirical legal scholarship have disagreed
about the current state of empirical legal scholarship," the general
consensus among legal scholars appears to be that more scholarship of that
nature, and better scholarship, would be a good thing.' 2 Empirical' 3legal
scholarship is likely the "next big thing in legal intellectual thought."'
Refocusing legal scholarship on what the data actually shows, rather
than fuzzy case studies or suppositions about testable realities, would help
increase the likelihood of legal scholarship producing meaningful real
world effects.' 4 "[L]egal scholarship-perhaps to a greater degree and
7.
AMERICAN AsSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS ANNUAL MEETING: EMPIRICAL
SCHOLARSHIP-WHAT SHOULD WE STUDY AND How SHOULD WE STUDY IT? (Jan 3-7, 2006),
available at http://www.aals.org/am2006/index.html. The conference topic is the "central
theme" of current AALS president William Hines. See Tracy E. George, An Empirical
Study of EmpiricalLegal Scholarship,81 IND. L.J. 141, 142 (2006).
8.
See Epstein & King, supra note 4; Richard L. Revesz, A Defense of Empirical
Legal Scholarship,69 U. CHI. L. REv. 169 (2002).
9.
See Richard H. McAdams & Thomas S. Ulen, Introduction: Symposium:
Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 791.
10.
See George, supra note 7, at 168.
11.
Epstein and King describe the "current state of empirical legal scholarship" as
"deeply flawed." Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 6. One of the authors they criticize,
Revesz, disagreed. See Revesz, supra note 8, at 170.
12.
See Mitchell, supra note 5, at 168 ("A prominent, if not yet consensus, view
within the legal academy is that legal scholars should produce more empirical research.").
13.
George, supra note 7, at 1.
14.
Unfortunately, empirical work remains rare in the pages of the nation's law
reviews. See McAdams & Ulen, supra note 9, at 791; Michael Heise, The Past, Presentand
Future of Empirical Legal Scholarship: JudicialDecisionmaking and the New Empiricism,
2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 819, 824 ("A quick glance at the current corpus of legal scholarship
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more immediately than most other research-has the potential to influence
public policy as it is promulgated by judges, legislators, and bureaucrats."' 5
Empirical scholarship in the law can help16 "to determine how people
respond to various legal rules and standards."'
Building a robust empirical literature requires more, however, than
simply having more law professors publish empirical work. Absent critical
reading and pre- and post-publication discussion and analysis, such
scholarship may find its way into "a court case, an administrative proceeding or a legislative hearing"' 7 before its implications and methodology have
been considered thoroughly. To the extent that such scholarship suffers
from methodological flaws or problems arising from flawed or incomplete
data, there may be serious negative consequences of basing policy or law
on untested research. 18 On the positive side, a critical reading of empirical
legal scholarship can help draw attention to the more creative, meaningful,
and reliable studies, and increase the likelihood that they will play a role in
shaping the development of legal rules.
Epstein and King suggested a number of features that "good" research
would have. 19 Such research would have a clear goal, and no matter what
the goal was, would subject its methodology to certain "rules." 20 Among
these rules: (1) "[r]esearch must be replicable"; 21 (2) research must be
viewed as a "social enterprise" (meaning its underpinnings must be
accessible for review and extension by others in the field); 22 (3) researchers
must acknowledge the uncertainty associated with empirical work;23 (4)
research should engage existing empirical literature; 24 (5) conduct research
26
important to the world; 25 (6) invoke theories with observable implications;
and (7) make an effort to account for rival hypotheses.27
Without endorsing any of these principles as "rules" for empirical
legal scholarship in the area of medical malpractice and tort reform, this
will convince most readers that empirical research's presence within the academic literature
is marginal, at best.").
15.
See Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 7.
16.
Thomas S. Ulen, A Nobel Prize in Legal Science: Theory, Empirical Work and
the Scientific Method in the Study of Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 875, 900 (2002).
17.
Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 17.
18.
Id.at 18.
19.
Id. at 19.
20. Id.
21.
Id. at 38.
22.
Id. at 57.
23.
Epstein & King, supra note 4, at 49.
Id. at 56-59.
24.
25.
Id. at 60-61.
26.
Id.at 65.
27.
Id. at 76-80.
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paper will attempt to assess the emerging empirical literature in this area
along these lines.
1I. LITERATURE ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND TORT REFORM

Unfortunately, time limitations prevent the review of every empirical
work on the topics of medical malpractice and tort reform. What I have
tried to do is select papers which cover a range of topics, and represent
different empirical methodologies and different types of data sets, to
demonstrate the broad range of questions researchers have to date sought to
use the power of empirical research to unravel.
A.

LITERATURE ON MALPRACTICE AND MEDICAL ERROR

1.

Medical Error
a. Studdert et al. (2000)

Between 1995 and 1998, David Studdert, a medical school professor,
joined by two co-authors, engaged in a study of medical injury in Utah and
Colorado designed to replicate the famed Harvard Medical Practice Study
of 1991 in a different environment.2 8 The results of the study, known as the
Utah-Colorado Medical Practice Study (UCMPS), were published in a 2000
issue of the Indiana Law Review.29
The UCMPS methodology consisted of sampling of medical records
from a group of non-randomly selected hospitals in the two states.30 Nurses
scanned selected records for indications of medical injury, such as the
occurrence of unexpected events during a hospital stay or unanticipated
readmissions. 3 1 Records indicating potential medical injury were then
reviewed by physicians.32 These efforts led to review of 4943 Utah records
and 9757 Colorado records.33 854 of the Utah records and 2014 Colorado

28.
See David M. Studdert et al., Beyond Dead Reckoning: Measures of Medical
Injury Burden, MalpracticeLitigation, and Alternative CompensationModels from Utah and
Colorado, 33 IND. L. REV. 1643, 1650-53 (2000). The HMPS study was based on 1984
data. Id. at 1652. Since then, managed care has emerged as a major force in health care
service delivery, and the rise of for-profit hospitals has also changed the landscape of health
care. Id. at 1652-53. Thus, the authors determined that an updating and robustness check of
the HMPS study was appropriate. Id.
29. Id. at 1657.
30. Id.
31.
Id. at 1658.
32. Id.
33.
Id. at 1659.
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records were flagged by nurses for physician review.3 4 Reviewing those
records, physicians identified 169 "adverse events" in Utah and 418 in
Colorado.3 5 2.9% of all hospital discharges in both states resulted in
adverse events.36
The most common adverse events were events connected with surgery,
accounting for 44.9% of all adverse events.3 7 16.9% of those events were
due to negligence, and approximately the same percentage led to permanent
disability. 38 Drug-related adverse events were the next most common
group. 39 More than one-third of all drug-related events were due to
negligence, such as prescription of the wrong drug, wrong dose, or
prescription of a drug to a patient known to have an allergy to that drug. 4°
The UCMPS generally tended to confirm the findings of the HMPS. 4'
However, the UCMPS indicated fewer deaths due to negligent medical
treatment than the HMPS report based on New York data.4 2
Some have criticized this study on the grounds that it was undertaken
in the states chosen because it was believed that sweeping malpractice
reform might be possible in those states; 43 by showing that medical error
rates were not responsive to litigation rates, the authors might remove a
"deterrent" justification for malpractice litigation."
While the study initially made a relatively mild splash after its publication, it was taken up by the activist Institute of Medicine
in 2000 and used
45
to promote reforms aimed at improving medical quality.
B.

LITERATURE ON THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION PROCESS

1.

MalpracticeLitigation
a. Black et al. (2005)

In a recent study, Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim
Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, Texas law professor Bernard Black and co34.
See Studdert et al., supra note 28, at 1659.
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 1660.
37.
Id.
38.
Id.
39.
Id.
40.
See Studdert et al., supra note 28, at 1660.
41.
Id. at 1661.
42.
See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors:
Theory and Evidence for MalpracticeReform, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1595, 1600 (2002).
43.
Id.

44.

45.

Id.

Id. at 1600-03.
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authors examined the claim that there is a "medical malpractice crisis"
using a database of closed claims maintained by the Texas Department of
Insurance (TDI).4 6 Specifically, the paper sought to determine if observed
dramatic upswings in malpractice insurance rates could be attributed to
47 The data set covers fifteen years. 48
changes in the litigation process.
based on confidential data sets, this study was
Unlike previous studies 49
based on a public dataset.
This study made quite the media splash when it was first released.
Articles and op-eds across the country reported the study's major findings.5 °
The authors presented their findings at a panel sponsored by the American
Enterprise Institute (video of that presentation is available on-line at
www.aei.org). s
The Texas data set has several important differences from the Florida
data set employed by Vidmar et al. in the study described in the following
subsection. The Texas Department of Insurance requires insurers to selfreport closed claims; Florida does not.52 According to the authors of the
Texas study, however, the two studies reached generally (but not entirely)
consistent findings.53 Both studies used closed claims databases, which
offer a more reliable picture of malpractice litigation than jury verdicts
because they include cases which settle (most malpractice claims, of course,
settle).
The Texas study reports several significant findings:
* Between 1990 and 2002, the percentage of claims producing "large"
payouts (more than $25,000 in54 1988 dollars) and the total number of
"large" claims paid were stable.
* The number of smaller paid claims fell by 68% between 1988 and
2002, 55 a "sharp" "decline[]. ' 56
See Black et al., supra note 1.
46.
47. The "usual suspects" include a rising number of claims, "skyrocketing"
settlements, and "out of control" juries. David Hyman & Bernard S. Black, Presenters,
Randall Bjovberg & Jonathan Klick, Discussants, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTrrUTE FOR
PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE: Is THERE A CRISIS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE?

(Mar. 31, 2005) (The authors found no support for any of these three explanations.).
48.
Black et al., supra note 1, at 209.
49.
Hyman, supra, note 47.
See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Malpractice Situation Not Dire, Study Finds, WASH.
50.
POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A8; Don Finley, Study says Medical MalpracticeCrisis is a Myth,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEws, Mar. 11, 2005; Stephanie Horvath, Study Bucks Tort Reform,
THE PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 22, 2005, at ID; Dan Margolies, No Unanimity in Reports on
Tort Reform, KANSAS CITY STAR, Mar. 15, 2005, at D18.
51.
Hyman, supra, note 47.
52.
Black et al., supra note 1,at 215.
53.
Hyman, supra, note 47.
54.
Black et al., supra note 1, at 209, 234-35.
55.
id. at 233.
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e The payouts of large claims (per large claim paid) rose slightlybetween 0.1% and 0.5% per year of study.5 7
over time and amounted to
o Total payouts were roughly constant
58
0.6% of Texas's total health care spending.
* Paid claims fell from 6.4 per 100 physicians in 1990-1992 to 4.6 per
100 physicians in 2000-2002. 5 ' 80% of claims in 2000-2002 closed with no
payout.6°
Based on these and other findings, the authors conclude "no crisis
involving malpractice claim outcomes occurred.",6 ' Given that malpractice
premiums fluctuated (and spiked upward in dramatic fashion 62) even in the
face of stable malpractice outcomes, the authors further conclude that a
"weak connection" exists between the tWo. 6 3 One of the conclusions the
authors draw is that policymakers concerned with insurance rate spikes
need to focus on the dynamics of the insurance market, rather than the
malpractice litigation process. 64 Tort reform, which targets the malpractice
litigation process, does not address the insurance market; therefore, one
implication of the study is that tort reform may not affect insurance
premia. 65
The most notable change during the time period observed by the authors was an increase in defense costs-both in terms of defense costs per
claim and, defense costs per payout. Adjusted for inflation, defense costs
per claim more than doubled during the observed period.66 The authors
67
plan to explore this pattern in future work. 67
Criticism of the study was prompt. John Opelt alleged that the authors
"cooked the data so much that they cooked the truth. 68 However, most of
the criticisms did not make a specific claim about the alleged methodological shortcomings of the paper. In reality, the paper is quite self-conscious
in its attention to potential limitations of the data set, 69 and displays a high

56.
Id. at 209.
57.
Id. at 210.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60.
Black et al., supra note 1, at 210.
61.
Id.
62.
Hyman, supra, note 47.
63.
Black et al., supra note 1, at 210.
64.
Id. at 253. The authors suggest various insurance-market explanations for the
observed malpractice premium spikes. Id.
65.
Hyman, supra, note 47.
66.
Black et al., supra note 1, at 243.
Black, supra, note 47.
67.
68.
Hyman, supra, note 47.
69.
See Black et al., supra note 1, at 218-22.
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concern for the integrity of its research method. 70 This paper represents
careful social science.
That said, some critics have raised concerns about particular features
of the analysis. One critic noted that the 1990 data may have depicted an
exaggerated level of claims (or paid claims) because it possibly included
claims from earlier years (1988 and 1989). 7 1 However, the authors have
conducted robustness tests, re-testing the data with different starting points
(1990 and 1991), and have reached essentially the same results. 72 Moreover, the study was based on public data, and critics may certainly return to
the data set and conduct their own evaluation of the Texas malpractice
experience.73
Randall Bjovberg of the American Enterprise Institute has argued that
the study obscures the actual manner in which insurance actuaries set
prices. 4 Bjovberg suggests that actuaries may systematically overcharge,
in response to a past crisis, trusting that markets will correct rates in time.
Bjovberg also feels that the study inadequately sought information from
insurers and actuaries (particularly, about how they set their rates) during
the course of the project, rather than waiting until afterwards.
Florida State Law Professor and economist Jonathan Klick's main
critique of the paper was that its state-wide aggregation led to the elimination of some interesting variation in the potential data. Klick suggested that
interesting future work would be to disaggregate variation by county level
and line of practice.75
b. Vidmar (2005)
Duke law professor Neil Vidmar recently published a study of medical
malpractice entitled "Medical Malpractice and the Tort System in Illinois,"
which may be of particular interest to the readers of this journal.7 6 The
study was commissioned by the Illinois State Bar Association,7 7 and was
charged with examining the "incidence, frequency, size of verdicts and
70.
In presenting the paper, Professor Black spent a good amount of time discussing
the limitations of the study. Black, supra, note 47.
71.
See Ted Frank, http://www.pointoflaw.com/archives/001013.php.
72.
Black, supra, note 47.
73.
However, the authors have apparently been reluctant to release the "clean"
version of their data set to other researchers. Klick, supra, note 47.
74.
Bjovberg, supra, note 47.
75.
Klick, supra, note 47.
76.
Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the Tort System in Illinois, (May 2005)
availableat
http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00001 125/01/Medical Malpractice andtheTortLSyste
m inIllinois.pdf [hereinafter Illinois Medical MalpracticeStudy].
77.
Id. at 2.
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other aspects of the medical malpractice system in Illinois. 78 Cook and
DuPage counties (the counties which include Chicago and its heavily
populated western suburbs), along with judicial "hellholes" St. Clair and
Madison counties, received attention. 79 The findings of the Vidmar study
are remarkably similar to the Black et al. Texas study described in the
previous subsection. The study recognizes that it is undisputed that there
has been a sharp upswing in medical malpractice insurance premiums, 8 0 but
finds no trends in the malpractice litigation environment that would explain
this pattern. Given that the study was based on different sets of data
sources but reached similar results, 81 a certain level of robustness may be
inferred.
In its executive summary, for instance, the study reports its major conclusions:
o In DuPage and Cook counties, there was no upward trend in medical
malpractice filings or filings per 100 treating physicians from 1994 through
2004, adjusted for population growth.82
o In DuPage and Cook counties, there was no substantial increase in
jury trials or plaintiff win rates between 2001 and 2004, and only minor
changes between 1996 and 2001.83
o The reputations of Madison and St. Clair counties as "judicial hellholes" were not justified. 84
These results inform the debate about non-economic damages caps:
generally, a $500,000 cap on non-economic damages would have little
effect on overall payouts and would not likely affect insurance rates,
although it would reduce compensation for some individual plaintiffs who
suffer catastrophic injuries.85
Vidmar's study was based on several sources: jury verdict reporters,
Bureau of Justice Statistics data sets, and the American Medical Association's annual report, Physician's Characteristicsand Distribution in the
U.S.86 However, despite a number of requests, Vidmar was unable to
obtain access to the closed medical malpractice database of the Illinois

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at i.
Id.
Id. at ii.
See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
IllinoisMedical MalpracticeStudy, supra note 76, at i.
Id. at i.
Id. at ii.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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Department of Insurance (the parallel data set to the TDI set used in the
Black study).87
c. Studdert et al. (2000)
The UCMPS, discussed previously, also tracked the relationship between identified "adverse events" and the likelihood of malpractice claims.
The authors identified eighteen malpractice claims from records that had
been reviewed.8 8 While the small number of claims meant that statistical
significance was impossible to achieve,89 the results do suggest some
interesting facts.
First, incidences of substandard care outstrip claims by a ratio of 5.1 to
1 in Utah and 6.7 to 1 in Colorado. 9° The volume of litigation does not
seem to affect the incidences of medical malpractice (that is to say, there is
no evidence of defensive medicine in response to malpractice, or at least, no
evidence of effective defensive medicine). 9 1
d.

Vidmar et al. (2005)

In a DePaul Law Review piece published in 2005, Professor Vidmar,
along with several co-authors, reported the results of a 14-year study of the
h Black study discussed
Florida medical malpractice system. 92 Lk
Like the
above, this study employed a closed claims dataset (in this case, one
maintained by the Florida Department of Health) to explore pre-trial
settlements and other "invisible" aspects of the medical malpractice
87.
Id. at 5. While this set of findings may be interesting to Illinois practitioners,
and may have some national application to the extent that there are counties in many states
viewed as particularly favorable and unfavorable to plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims, I
do not wish to discuss it in detail.
88.
Studdert et al., supra note 28, at 1663.
89.
Id. at 1663.
90.
Id. at 1664. Various explanations for the small rate of claims for negligenceinduced injury have been offered.
One possible reason is that the injury was too minor to warrant a lawsuit.
• . . Another possible reason is that attorneys, who typically work on
contingency fee arrangements, are only willing to take on claims for 'attractive' clients (i.e., sympathetic victims with large damage claims).
Alternatively, some people are simply not litigious in nature.
JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITrEE OF THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS, LiABmrrY FOR MEDICAL

MALPRACTICE: ISSUES AND EVIDENCE, at 3 (May 2003), available at

http://www.house.gov/jec/tort/05-06-03.pdf.
91.
Studdert et al, supra note 28. at 1663.
92.
Neil Vidmar et al., Uncovering the "Invisible" Profile of Medical Malpractice
Litigation: Insights from Florida, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 315 (2005) [hereinafter Florida
Closed Claims Study].
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litigation process.93 The Florida Department of Health data set was
developed as a result of a 1975 Florida law. 94 It is public information.9 5
While there are some coding errors and limitations to the data set,96 the
authors seem to have done their best to minimize the effect of those
limitations on their research.
The major conclusions of the study were as follows:
* Between 1990 and 2004, while the rate of per capita payment for
medical malpractice claims fluctuated (with an increase from 1995-1999
and a decrease since 1999), the study found that generally, the number of
paid claims dropped during the period.97
* The median and mean
98 payment per paid claim increased substantially since the early 1990s.
* The severity of injury for closed claims increased during the period
observed. 99 While the authors could not reach a firm conclusion about the
reasons why the median and mean payment per paid claim increased so
substantially, their research suggested that a "change in case mix" may
explain some of that upward trend.' °°
* The frequency of large claims - defined as those over a million dollars - jumped substantially (both in total amount and as a percentage of all
claims paid) during the studied period.' 0 ' Interestingly, while the number
of large claims increased, the average payment for those with such claims
did not increase. 102
9 The costs of defending paid claims did not increase substantially
during the period studied.' 03
There are some obvious differences between these findings and the
findings of the Black study that merit further consideration, comparison and
research.

93.
Id. at 318.
94.
Id. at 323.
95. Id.
96.
Id. at 324.
97.
Id. at 334.
98.
FloridaClosed Claims Study, supra note 92, at 336.
99.
Id. at 342.
100.
Id. at 345. The authors describe this as one of the "most interesting and striking
findings" of their study. Id. at 355. One possible explanation would be "an increase in more
serious medical negligence leading to deaths, but a plausible competing explanation is that
around 1996, plaintiffs' lawyers and their clients began to select and pursue more cases
involving deaths during medical treatment." Id.
101.
Id. at 345.
102.
Id. at 346.
103.
Id. at 351.
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Harriset al. (2002)

In a 2002 paper, Wake Forest sociology professor Catherine T. Harris,
joined by law professors Ralph Peeples and Tomas Metzloff of Wake and
Duke, respectively, addressed the impact of "witness potential" and
"attorney reputation" on medical malpractice claim outcomes. 1°4 The
authors aim to examine whether these "strategic variables" affect recovery
rates.10 5
The authors utilized insurance company closed claims files on cases
filed in North Carolina state courts between 1991 and 1995.1°6 The authors
obtained these files from a major teaching hospital in North Carolina and
from one of the principal medical malpractice insurers in the state. 107 They
selected case files based on whether there was a court order in the file
sending the case to pre-trial mediation, 0 8 and linked up the closed claims
data with court files. 109
The authors approach their research questions by comparing the effect
of three "strategic factors" -the "witness potential of the plaintiff," the
"witness potential of the defendant physician," and the "reputation of the
plaintiff s attorney"-on the settlement process.' 0 These variables were all
measured in terms of the "insurer's perception of' the relevant witness
potential or attorney reputation."' Based on "specific statements" in the
case file, the authors coded plaintiff and defendant witness potential on a
one-to-five scale ranging from "below average" to "excellent.""12 With
respect to the plaintiffs attorney's reputation, the authors used specific
statements (where present) to code the variable from one (below average) to
three (above average)." 13 The authors used the data to construct two
"strategic advantage" variables. 114 The first, "plaintiffs advantage," was
coded as one if the plaintiff had an "excellent" witness potential, the
defendant a below average potential, or the plaintiff an above average

104.
See Catherine T. Harris et al., Placing "Standard of Care" in Context: The
Impact of Witness Potential and Attorney Reputation in Medical Malpractice Litigation,

No. 02-14 (September 2002),
availableat http://ssrn.conabstract=333560.
105.
Id. at 2.
106.
Id. at 10.
107.
Id. The authors do not reveal the identity of either source in their findings.
108.
Id. at 10.
109.
Id.
110.
Harris et al., supra note 104, at 9.
111.
Id. at 14.
112.
Id.
113.
Id. at 14-15.
114.
Id. at 15.
WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW RESEARCH PAPER
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attorney reputation; and zero otherwise." 5 A similar variable was
constructed for "defendant's advantage."' " 6 The authors controlled for
injury severity."'
This approach raises some obvious concerns. For one, the researchers
coded the variables themselves based on qualitative reading of insurance
files. Two levels of bias might play a role. On the one hand, the researchers might not consistently code variables-hard judgment calls between
categories might not always be made consistently. Second, even where
researcher error or bias are not present (that is, where researchers are
coding "machines"), the files themselves may not be accurate. While
machine-like researchers could accurately code what insurers wrote about
reputation and witness potential, that might not be the same thing that
insurers actually thought. A further problem may arise when it comes time
to plug the variables into a statistical process. When variables are
"categorical" and qualitative in nature, where only "integer" values are
possible, but are then subjected to quantitative analysis that presumes such
variables are continuous in nature, small differences in coding may become
amplified in the results.
However, the results were quite interesting. Where insurers' outside
reviewers rated liability as probable, most cases settled, and strategic
variables had no major impact. 18 However, strategic variables did play a
role where liability was rated as uncertain or unlikely. In such instances,
pro-physician strategic variables made settlement less likely, while cases in
which the plaintiff had an advantage were mote likely to settle. " 9
This is one of the few existing empirical studies that has analyzed the
settlement process in medical malpractice cases. Because data on jury
awards is more readily available and perhaps more reliable than settlement
data, most researchers have concentrated on jury awards, even though
everyone acknowledges that settlement is a far more frequent outcome in
medical malpractice cases 20 than is a jury or bench trial.
2.

Jury Behavior and Psychology
a. Vidmar (1993)

Duke law professor and trained social psychologist Neil Vidmar authored Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.
Harris et al.,
supra note 104,at 15.
Id.at 16.
Id.at 2.
Id.at 2.
Id.at 9.
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for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, in 1993.121 Unlike
other "empirical" empirical papers, which apply regression techniques to
existing data sets, this paper consisted of a survey-type experiment. The
author sought to evaluate the "common complaint from all sides of the
political spectrum ...

that jurors are biased against doctors and hospitals

because they believe that someone ought to pay when a serious medical
injury occurs and that doctors and hospitals have the 'deep pockets' to
provide the compensation."' 122 The question addressed by the author is
undoubtedly important, but one must be cautious about basing policy on
experimental evidence.
The published article reviews existing assertions regarding jury bias
against doctors, hospitals, and other likely medical malpractice defendants. 123 The author also reviews existing empirical evidence on the "deep
pockets" notion. 124 Two studies conducted in the 1980s using Rand
Corporation data found that awards against corporate medical malpractice
defendants were larger than against other types of defendants, and that
awards against doctors were higher than awards against other individual
defendants in malpractice cases.1 25 Other studies have questioned some
aspects of those results, but generally support the notion that "deep
pockets" play a role in malpractice verdicts. 126
Vidmar rejects the findings of these studies on the ground that the
studies are "methodologically flawed beyond redemption."' 127 Notably,
work on data derived from case reporters contains "no information about
the lawsuits that were settled, dropped, or disposed of through judicial
rulings." 128 Driven by the perceived lack of evidence "one1 29way or the
other" in previous studies, Vidmar proceeds to his experiment.

121.
Neil Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the Deep Pockets Hypothesis: Jury Awards
for Pain and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217 (1993). The article
was subsequently expanded into a full length book, see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE,
DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AwARDs (1995).

122.
Id. at 218.
123.
Id. at 218-24.
124.
Id. at 224-62.
125.
Id. at 225-27.
126.
Id. at 226-27.
127.
Vidmar, supra note 121, at 262.
128.
Id. at 227. This objection is only really fair if "deep pocket" defendants differ
in the rate at which their malpractice claims proceed all the way to "reporter"-stage
resolution. If deep-pocketed defendants are no more or less likely to have their cases settle,
drop, or otherwise be resolved before the conclusion of a trial and the entry of a verdict, than
the case selection problem should not actually alter the findings regarding the impact of
having deep pockets.
129.
Id. at 240-41.
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The experiment studied the attitudes of 147 "veniremen," that is to
say, potential jurors, who were awaiting jury service in Wake County
(Raleigh), North Carolina. 30 These individuals were presented with case
packets, with certain factors varying across subjects. Some were presented
with malpractice injuries, others with automobile accidents. The type of
defendant was also varied-malpractice cases involved either a single
physician defendant, multiple physician defendants, or a hospital defendant
(auto accidents cases also included either one, two or a business corporation
defendant). As a result, there were six separate groups of subjects, each
given a packet of information that varied along two lines.' 31 Between 21
and 26 subjects were in each category.132 Each juror was told to award
slightly less than $34,000
in medical bills and was asked to affix a sum for
133
suffering.
and
pain
The mean and median "pain and suffering" awards were calculated
and reported. Subjects awarded more damages in medical negligence than
auto negligence circumstances.
But the single defendant cases also
produced higher average awards than the hospital/corporation defendant,
contrary to the results the "deep pockets" hypothesis would lead one to
expect. 134 Yet, unsurprisingly given the small sample size, none of the
results were statistically 1significant;
the results "can be ascribed to chance
35
fluctuations in the data."'
There are a number of problems with this kind of experimental work
that make it of questionable utility in policy debates. First of all, for survey
participants, not much was at stake. Jurors were asked to volunteer, but had
no particular incentive to do so. Unlike in a jury room, where jurors know
that the consequence of their decisions leads one party to either win or lose
(and where jurors must reach a resolution in order to go home), jurors in
this study were free to walk away. Indeed, the author acknowledges that "a
few jurors did not complete the study after volunteering."13 6 In most
experiments conducted by "experimental economists," real rewards or
punishments are implemented in order to ensure that subjects behave in a
more realistic way. In other field work Vidmar and others have conducted,
they were able to obtain access to actual jury deliberations. 137
130.
Id. at 243.
131.
Id.
132.
Id.
133.
Vidmar, supra note 121, at 246.
134.
Id. at 255 ("This experiment yielded no support for the deep pockets hypothesis
or the psychological dynamics that are posited to be behind it.").
135.
Id. at 250.
136.
Id.
137.
See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Neil Vidmar et. al., Juror Discussions
During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REv. 1 (2003). Such
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Nor was the study fully "blind." The subjects knew they were being
tested as part of a "juror decisionmaking" experiment (although the subjects
did not know whether they fell into the "treatment" or "control" groups,
they did know that their "decisionmaking" was the object of the study). A
further problem is that the subjects were volunteers; yet the author gives no
information about how many of the "venirement waiting to be called for
jury selection" declined to volunteer, or about any differences between the
volunteers and the non-volunteers.
Three more general problems deserve mention. First, studying potential jurors isn't the same as studying real jurors. There was no "voir dire"
prior to the administration of the study. Any number of the potential
subjects could have been the type to be removed from a panel for cause.
Second, studying the individual attitudes of a single potential juror
tells us little about jury decisionmaking, which is a collective, rather than
individual exercise.
Finally, and perhaps most substantially, analyzing jurors' pre-trial
attitudes towards "deep pocket" defendants may not tell us what jurors
think post-trial. A clever plaintiff's lawyer may have the potential to help
arouse a bias against deep pocketed defendants that was latent prior to trial.
For instance, a plaintiffs' lawyer could paint the corporate hospital
defendant as greedy, obsessed with the number of patients processed and
billing rather than providing health care. Such a depiction might help
trigger a jury to give a larger award against a "deep pocket" defendant.
Given the small sample size involved, the Vidmar project was not able
to produce any powerful insights into the malpractice litigation process. In
a subsequent paper, Vidmar explains, "Current research findings do not
allow us to rule out the deep pockets hypothesis' 38as a factor in jury awards,
but it has anything but solid empirical support."'
b. Merritt & Barry (1999)
A 1999 Ohio State Law Journal article by Deborah Merritt and Catherine Barry used empirical information from a single county (Franklin
39
County, Ohio) to evaluate the behavior of juries in tort cases generally.'
However, one section of the paper focused on medical malpractice cases.

studies are costly and difficult to carry out, which is why they are not more common. See
Hans & Albertson, supra note 2, at 1504.
138.
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical
Perspective, 40 ARIz. L. REv. 849, 879 (1998).
139.
See Deborah Jones Merritt & Kathryn Ann Barry, Isthe Tort System in Crisis?
New EmpiricalEvidence, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 315 (1999).
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The authors focused solely on Franklin County, Ohio (most notably,
home to the Ohio State University and the city of Columbus).14° The
authors reviewed all jury verdicts rendered from 1986 through 1996 in
product liability and medical malpractice cases tried in the Court of
Common Pleas.' 4' The authors relied on a LEXIS database of jury verdicts
(which combined various commercial jury verdict services) and a collection
of verdicts gathered and published
by an Ohio attorney acting on behalf of
42
the state bar association.
The dependent variables examined by the study were a dichotomous
variable coded as one for plaintiff victory and zero for defense victory, and
a linear variable indicating size of the plaintiff's victory. 43 Multivariate
regressions were used to determine the effect of more than two dozen
independent variables on the dependent variables (with logistic regressions
used for the limited dependent variable analysis). 144
The statistics painted a perhaps counterintuitive but not truly surprising picture of jury treatment of malpractice claims. Plaintiffs lost most
cases - 69.3% of the cases they took to court. 45 Where successful, plaintiff
claims produced widely divergent results: ranging from a low of $2703 to a
high of $12 million. 146 The median verdict for prevailing medical
malpractice plaintiffs was $198,000, while the mean, overweighing a few
large verdicts, was $828,630 for successful plaintiffs. 47 Compared to
products liability plaintiffs, successful medical malpractice plaintiffs had a
lower median award, but a higher mean award, and were more likely to
have their verdict reduced or overturned
on appeal (or as part of a settle48
ment during the appeals process). 1
The main limitation of the study was that there were such a small
number of jury verdicts in the selected county in the given year. 49
As a
140.
Id. at 319.
141.
Id. at 322.
142.
Id. at 323-24. Initially, the authors noted that the commercial verdict services
woefully underreported entered verdicts. Id. at 324.
143.
Id. at 326.
144.
Id. at 326. The treatment variables included: plaintiff and defendant identity
(individual, agency, or institution), whether plaintiff was an insurance company pursuing a
claim via subrogation, gender and age for individual plaintiffs and defendants. Id. at 327.
For medical malpractice claims, the study coded whether only institutional defendants
appeared at trial, whether M.D.s appeared, and whether non-M.D. health care workers
(nurses, optometrists, dentists and others) appeared at trial. Id. In addition, the authors
coded claims of negligent failure to diagnose, failure to obtain informed consent, nonmedical
error, and negligent medical treatment. Id. at 328.
145.
Merritt & Barry, supra note 139, at 352.
146.
Id.
147.
Id. at 353.
148.
Id. at 353-54.
149.
Id. at 351.
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result, a number of the authors' observations, such as the predominance of
women among trial plaintiffs and successful plaintiffs, were not statistically
significant. 150 Similarly, a number of factors that one would expect to
affect outcomes did not produce significant results (e.g., death of plaintiff
had no effect on outcomes). The only statistically significant factors (at the
.05 level of confidence) in determining whether a plaintiff won or lost were
(1) whether the defendant admitted liability (quite obviously, admissions of
liability predicted plaintiff success); (2) the gender of the defense attorney
(female attorneys marginally led to defense victories); (3) non-M.D. status
of the defendant (non-M.D.'s were more likely to lose); (4) the presence of
a prior trial (plaintiffs won less where there was a prior trial); (5) trial
length (longer trials favored plaintiffs); and (6) date of the verdict during
the course of the studied period (plaintiff success became less likely as time
passed).15 Similarly, the only significant factors in predicting verdict size
were: (1) female lawyer for the defendant (smaller verdicts where defense
represented by female lawyer); (2) female plaintiff (larger verdicts won by
female plaintiffs); (3) date (verdicts becoming marginally smaller with
time); and152(4) length of pretrial period (verdicts became smaller as time
went on).
Some of these variables may be confounded-for example, it would
have been useful to add a control for the number of motions for summary
judgment or dismissal, or the number of claims dismissed or adjudicated
prior to trial. Such factors might lengthen the pretrial period, but also
suggest a weak case that is less likely to yield a high verdict. Thus, the
conclusion that "[1]engthy pre-trial preparations appear to pay off for
defendants"'' 53 may be premature.
Interestingly, the authors found that plaintiff settlement demands were
closer to the eventual verdicts than were defendant settlement offers.' 54 The
percentage of "zero offer" cases-where defendants apparently never made
a settlement offer-was also much higher in the medical malpractice
55
context than the observed result in the products liability context. 1
From these results-in particular, the decline in verdict size and plaintiff success rates between 1992 and 1997-the authors conclude that there
was "no crisis" in the Franklin Country tort system during the twelve years
preceding 1997, when tort reform took effect in the state of Ohio. 5 6 I wish
the authors had been a bit more cautious in some of their conclusions. For
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 355.
Merritt & Barry, supra note 139, at 357 tbl. 111-5.
Id. at 358 tbl. 111-6.
Id. at 370.
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 381.
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instance, they write: "Current tort reform is a blunderbuss. .

.

. Our

comprehensive analysis of medical malpractice and product liability
verdicts reveals a system of few trials, low win rates, declining verdicts and
rare punitive awards."' 157 To call an analysis of a single county (which, in
spite of the authors' assertions, may be less typical than they imagine due to
the presence of an elite state university health system), over just a one
decade period, is hardly "comprehensive." While the study produced some
interesting results (specifically in terms of effects of gender on medical
malpractice outcome), reviewing barely a hundred cases cannot be expected
to produce an accurate depiction of the "system" as a whole, if by system
we mean the American medical malpractice liability regime.
C.

LITERATURE ON TORT REFORM

1.

Screening Panels and MandatoryArbitration
a.

Yoon (2004)

Northwestern University law professor Albert Yoon has published two
studies on popular tort reform policies. The first of these studies, Mandatory Arbitration and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the West, examines the effects of Nevada's move
to mandatory pre-litigation screening panels in medical malpractice
litigation. 158 Given that a number of other states have enacted such panels
in recent years, 159 Yoon's work has great potential significance.
Supporters of pre-litigation screening panels argue that such panels
can produce resolution of malpractice claims more rapidly and in a more
cost-effective manner than traditional litigation.' 60 Because such panels are
staffed by medical experts, they are also touted as weeding out frivolous

claims. 161

Nevada's law took effect on January 1, 1986.162 It required plaintiffs
alleging medical malpractice (against a physician, hospital, or hospital
employee) to "submit their claims to a medical-legal screening panel."' 63
Each panel consists of three physicians and three attorneys, chosen from a
pool of panelists selected by the Nevada State Medical Association and the
157.
Merritt & Barry, supra note 139, at 398.
158.
Albert Yoon, Mandatory Arbitration and Civil Litigation:An Empirical Study
of MedicalMalpracticeLitigation in the West, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 95 (2004).
159. Id. at 96 (nineteen states have some form of non-binding pre-trial panel review).
160. Id. at 97.
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 98.
163.
Id.
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Nevada Bar.164 The panel makes a determination of whether the plaintiff
has suffered "a wrongful injury" and a separate judge determines, for cases
where a panel finds in the affirmative, the amount of damages. 165 The
results are non-binding, in the sense that either party can pursue their claim
in court regardless of the results of a panel's liability or judge's damages
determination.' 66 However, a party that forces litigation and receives a less
favorable outcome after a trial must pay a penalty. 167 Between 1986 and the
law's sunset in 1989, that penalty consisted of forfeiting a $5,000 pre-trail
bond. 168 After 1989, a party that ignored a panel's recommendation and
proceeded to trial had to pay court costs and reasonable attorneys fees to the
other side if that party was less successful at trial.' 69
Yoon's aspiration is to test the impact, and effectiveness, of Nevada's
screening panels. He utilized two sources of data. First, "individual-level
' 70
data from multiple insurers on medical malpractice claims in Nevada,"'
which was gathered by a consulting company at the request of the Nevada
legislature.' 7' This data set includes information on whether a claim went
to a screening panel, and the panel's determination. 72 The second data
source, which comes from a national malpractice insurer called The
Doctors Company (TDC), consists of individual-level data on medical
does not
malpractice claims in Nevada, California and Montana-but
73
provide information on screening panel determinations. 1
For the first data set (from the Nevada legislature), Yoon uses ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions to determine the effect of how the claim
was resolved (after panel screening, or at trial) on the damages plaintiffs
recover, the duration of litigation, and the174 amount the insurer paid in
allocated loss adjustment expenses (ALAE).
For the second data set (from TDC), Yoon uses a statistical technique
popular in economics known as a "difference-in-difference" approach. 75
As Yoon explains, "[t]his approach measures the changes in outcomes after
a policy is instituted on one group (treatment) relative to changes in
Yoon, supra note 158, at 100. Parties would be allowed to eliminate individual
164.
attorneys or physicians from the panel after a sort of voir dire, with replacements selected by
administrators of the panel. Id.
165.
Id.at 98.
166.
Id.
167.
Id.
168.
Id. at 102.
169.
Id. at 103.
170.
Yoon, supra note 158, at 103.
171.
Id. at 104.
Id. at 105.
172.
Id.
173.
Id. at 110.
174.
175.
Id.
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outcomes over the same period for another group (control) not subject to
the policy controls." 176 The approach compares the "difference" within
each group to the difference between each group.
These two statistical approaches produce some interesting results. The
analysis of the Nevada legislative data set suggests that moving to prelitigation screening panels reduces the number of claims resolved by courts
by almost nine percentage points.177 The average length of time to resolve a
claim was more than 24 months before screening panels, but just 20 months
after. 178 At the same time, damages payouts by insurers fell by more than
7% as well. 179 However, while payouts declined, that appears to have been
due to fewer payouts rather than a decrease in the amount obtained by
plaintiffs when they got a recovery. 80 Fewer plaintiffs recovered after
screening panels, but those that did enjoyed a recovery of, on average, more
than $50,000 more than pre-screening panel recovery amounts.18
The difference-in-difference analysis of the TDC data set, however,
suggests that these trends were not the result of Nevada's introduction of
screening panels. California and Montana-states that Yoon characterizes
as having demographic similarities to Nevada sufficient to permit comparisons-had no screening panels. 8 2 Yet comparisons across the same time
frame (in which Nevada implemented its screening panel approach)
revealed that these states experienced similar reductions in payouts, shorter
claim durations, and ALAE for the insurance company. 183 As a result, the
difference-in-difference analysis did not produce statistically significant
results. 184
Many law professors hesitate to conduct empirical research precisely
because they are concerned about a lengthy research endeavor failing to
produce statistically significant results. A lack of statistical significance
often renders an empirical analysis "uninteresting," and therefore unworthy
of publication. Yoon's paper on the Nevada screening panels presents one
of those rare instances where the failure to obtain statistical significance is,
in and of itself, interesting.
Considered alone, the Nevada legislature data provide high praise for
Nevada's screening panel approach. Screening panels seem, from that
analysis, to improve plaintiff outcomes in meritorious claims but reduce
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Yoon, supra note 158, at 110.
Id.at 113.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 114.
Id.
Yoon, supra note 158, at 125.
Id.
Id.
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payouts overall for medical malpractice. Yet the TDC data analysis
indicates that some other social, economic, or legal force, produced the
same types of changes even where no panels were implemented.
Part of Yoon's failure to obtain statistical significance may be due to
the relatively small size of his Nevada TDC data when compared to the
much larger California data set. Yoon had only 800 or so Nevada
observations, compared to 10,000 for the control states (Montana and
California).' 85 It is unfortunate that Yoon was unable to access insurance
data from other private insurers, or data covering a broader time period that
would include more claims. Including both Montana and California in a
single "control" category also may have obscured differences between
Montana and California results that might have been interesting.
The paper also may have benefited from a more thorough consideration of possible differences between TDC and other malpractice insurance
providers. As Yoon points out, TDC is a doctor-owned insurance company.
While it no doubt competes with more traditional insurance providers (and
must therefore behave in a somewhat similar fashion to survive in a
competitive market), it may yet have a systematically different approach to
litigation (or, may have changed its approach during the relevant time
period) such that the differences across states were minimized by the results
of changes instituted by that single insurer.' 86
Finally, given Yoon's finding that the changes in Nevada's malpractice environment post-screening panel mirrored similar changes in
California and Montana, more discussion or speculation as to what
prompted those changes in all three states might have been useful (in
particular, to prod further research on the observed patterns).
Still, Yoon's paper provides an excellent example of both the promise
and the peril of empirical research on medical malpractice and tort reform.
Standing alone, the Nevada legislature data buttresses the arguments of prelitigation screening panel supporters. Yet the sharp results found through
analyzing
that data set are washed away by further analysis of the TDC
87
data. 1
The paper answers at least one question about screening panels: Are
they a panacea for the problems alleged to exist in the medical malpractice
tort process? That answer appears from the initial results to be: no. At the
185.
Id. at 108.
186.
Other studies have revealed, for example, that mutual medical malpractice
insurance companies (that is, companies owned by the insured doctors) experienced the most
dramatic upswings in insurance rates. Hyman & Black, Presenters, Bjovberg & Klick,
Discussants, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research Conference: Is There
a Crisis in Medical Malpractice? (Mar. 31, 2005) (Those differential upswings may prompt
differential approaches to litigation.).
187.
Yoon, supra note 159, at 128.
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same time, such panels do provide an alternative (or supplemental) forum
for litigants, and may help serve the policy goal of judicial economy by
resolving some share of potential lawsuits outside of the court system.
From that perspective, such panels may be a good idea.
2.

Non-Economic Damages Caps
a. Sharkey (2005)

An empirical analysis by Columbia Law School Professor Catherine
M. Sharkey aimed to evaluate the extent of "cross-over" effects in noneconomic damages caps in medical malpractice cases.' 88
The author
supposed that such caps might have effects other than simply capping
damages according to the statutory scheme. Other authors had addressed
unintended consequences' 89 of such caps, including "anchoring" effects, in
which jury verdicts are drawn towards the damages limit. 90 Sharkey
instead focuses on a related unintended effect: "where noneconomic
damages are capped in medical malpractice cases, some portion of those
damages might spill over into the still-unlimited economic damages
category .... "191
In a sign of honesty, Sharkey acknowledges that her "initial intuition
of just such a spillover emerged from reading medical malpractice cases in
which very large awards were given ... in states that enforce caps on the
noneconomic portion of compensatory damages."' 192 When an empirical
project begins with "initial intuitions" formed by non-empirical, casual
observation of anecdotes, one worries that an author may not be interested
in following the data wherever it may lead. This worry is compounded by
the fact that the author only begins 93
her discussion of her original empirical
1
article.
the
into
pages
analysis fifty

188.
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice
Damages Caps, 80 N.Y.U. L. REv. 391 (2005).
189.
Id. at 418.
190.
Id.
191.
Id. at 429. Sharkey speculates about several explanations for such cross-over
effects. Attorneys "may have learned new ways to pitch their arguments about economic
damages to juries." Id. at 429. Jurors may systematically award "holistically"-determined
damages. Id. at 430. That is to say, a jury may award a total amount of damages that a
plaintiff should receive without considering economic versus non-economic damages in
great detail. Id. Jurors may thus substitute economic damages for non-economic damages in
the face of hard caps to help obtain that "right" amount of total damages. Id. Expert
witnesses may also play a role. Id. at 437-439.
192.
Id.
193.
See id. at 444.
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However, the author dispels such concerns in reporting her conclusion:
that, "surprisingly," once one controls for severity of injury, non-economic
damages caps have little or no effect on compensatory (economic)
damages. 9 4 Moreover, the author is especially careful to describe
96
limitations in her data, 195 and in terms of interpretation of her results.
The author used data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and the National Center for State Courts to construct her data set.' 97 From the 2383
medical malpractice cases in the data set, she restricts her study to those
557 cases involving jury verdicts in which plaintiffs recovered jury
verdicts. 98 She dubs this data set the "Combined Medical Malpractice"
(CMM) dataset (combined in the sense that it includes data from three
sampled years, 1992, 1996 and 2001).199 The author tests two dependent
variables: the jury's economic damages award, and the trial judge's entered
economic damages award.2°°
Independent variables include litigant
characteristics (e.g., defendant identity, number of plaintiffs and defendants); 20 1 categorical measures of victim injury, according to the BJS's
categorization; 20 2 and dummy variables reflecting a state's tort reform laws,
including non-economic damages caps, collateral source rule reforms,20 3
medical expert screening panels, and patient compensation funds (coded as
one for the existence of a particular tort reform and zero otherwise). 204
Oddly, although the author recognizes that such reforms are often enacted
in groups, 2 °5 she does not seem to have constructed interaction terms for
these variables to test whether particular groupings are more or less
effective at producing particular results. Other tested variables include
partisan judicial elections and county demographic characteristics.
Ultimately, the empirical techniques produce two empirical results:
severity of plaintiff injury correlates with plaintiffs' recovery of economic
damages, and once severity is taken into account, non-economic damages
194.
Sharkey, supra note 188, at 445.
195.
Id. at 448.
196.
Id. at 446.
197.
Id. at 446.
198.
Id. at 450.
199.
Id. at 450.
Sharkey, supra note 188, at 453.
200.
201.
Id. at 454-55.
202.
Id.
203.
The collateral source rule provides that a plaintiffs award may not be reduced if
benefits have been paid from other sources (such as workers compensation or health
insurance). Id. at 457. Reform of that rule involves legislative efforts to allow reduction in
plaintiff awards based on alternative payments received by such plaintiffs from collateral
sources. Id.
204.
Id. at 456.
205.
See id. at 456 n. 291.
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caps do not have spillover effects on economic damages.2 °6 From a
qualitative perspective, the author finds that compensatory damages do
seem to be smaller, controlling for other variables including injury severity,
where there is a non-economic damages cap (contradicting her "initial
intuition").20 7 However, the regressions do not produce statistically
significant coefficients on the "non-economic damages caps" dummies. 208
Unfortunately, the author is unable to exploit what would be the most
interesting type of variation here due to the small number of cases in the
data set.2° Ideally, what one would want is a number of states that altered
their combination of tort reform policies (in particular, their non-economic
damages caps) during the period covered by the data. Changes in the
dependent variable could then be linked up to changes in the policy regime
that occurred during the relevant time period (either because new laws were
enacted, or because existing laws were struck down). Only Ohio and
Illinois changed their non-economic damages caps regimes in the data
employed by the author, and there were only a handful of cases from those
states 2that
reached a jury verdict for the plaintiff in medical malpractice
10
cases.

The author also expresses regret at having been unable to effectively
employ instrumental variables (IV) analysis to cope with potential
endogeneity in the regressions (that is, cope with the problem that damage
awards patterns might lead to the enactment of particular non-economic
damages policies, rather than vice versa). That effort proves unsuccessful
because the selected instrument ends up not being correlated with the
potentially endogenous treatment variable. 2 1' Regardless, the effort to use
state legislature party affiliation was probably doomed from the start, for
other reasons. The author describes her attempt to use state legislature
party affiliation as a variable which might "affect whether cap legislation is
passed in a particular state, but not have any impact on damages award
amounts. ' 212 A better instrumental variable in this context would be one
that could be said to cause damages caps to be enacted, but not itself be
correlated with (as opposed to "have any impact on") damages awards.
The partisan affiliation of state legislatures is a terrible instrumental
variable in the sense that it is highly likely to be in no small part caused by
patterns in damages awards. Where damages awards are extremely high,
perhaps Republicans will rise to power. Or perhaps damages awards will
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Sharkey, supra note 188, at 469.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 473-74.
Id. at 466 n. 336 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id at 467.

20061

DOCTORS, DuTIEs, DEATH AND DATA

be extremely high because Democrats are in power. In any case, a better
instrumental variable is one that does not suffer from the same endogeneity
2
concerns as the original independent variable; party affiliation seems to. 13
However, that variable has been used by other authors - although such
authors typically attempt to use other variables to ensure robustness in the
instrumental variables approach.21 4
I have some concern about the limitation of the data set to only those
cases in which juries awarded verdicts. It is possible that the effects of noneconomic damages caps are not limited to altering verdict amounts where
verdicts favor plaintiffs. Non-economic damages caps could alter lawyer
strategy in ways that increase, or decrease, overall effectiveness at court
and may affect whether there is any recovery at all. They might also have
signaling or norm-generating effects (that are difficult to test for empirically) that alter jury preferences for plaintiffs as opposed to defendants in
medical malpractice cases.
3.

Reform Generally
a. Klick and Stratmann(2003)

In a 2003 paper, Jonathan Klick (a lawyer-economist now of Florida
State University Law School) and Thomas Stratmann (a George Mason
economist) addressed the effects of a variety of tort reform measures on two
dependent variables: (1) physician mobility and relocation and (2) health
2
outcomes. 215
These two talented econometricians use American Medical
Association annual data on the number of doctors by specialty in each state
between 1980 and 1998.216 To measure health outcomes, the authors use
infant mortality. 21 7 The health reforms studied included non-economic
damages caps, total damages caps, collateral-source rule elimination, the
abolition of joint and several liability, contingency fee restrictions,
requirements for defendants to set up annuities, and the adoption of victims'
compensation funds.21 8 Generally, Klick and Stratmann use dummy
variables to measure whether a state has a particular reform. 219 Although,
with variables such as non-economic damages caps, Klick and Stratmann
213.
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instrumentalvariablesestimation.
214.
See Jonathan Klick and Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical MalpracticeReform
Help States Retain Physicians and Does it Matter? (working paper, 2003), at 11.
215.
See Jonathan Klick & Thomas Stratmann, Does Medical Malpractice Reform
Help States Retain Physicians and Does it Matter? (working paper, 2003).
216.
Id. at 2.
217.
Id. at 3.
218.
Id. at 7 (coding as "one" when a state has such a policy and "zero" when it does
not).
219.
Id.
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also test separate regression specifications distinguishing between cap
levels. 220 The analysis of doctor relocation uses state fixed effects with
changes in medical malpractice law treated as "exogenous shocks" to state
health care systems that might influence doctor location decisions. 22' This
approach allows Klick and Stratmann to capture how changes in policy
affect changes in the dependent variables, controlling for various factors.222
Generally, Klick and Stratmann find that medical malpractice reform
does help states retain doctors.22 3 Such reforms do seem to improve health
outcomes for African-American infants, but not for white infants.224 But
one reform - reversal of the collateral source rule - seems to reduce
positive health outcomes.2 25 The net effects of malpractice reform on both
location and care decision thus appears mixed.
With respect to doctor location, Klick and Stratmann find that noneconomic damages caps lead to a statistically significant positive number of
doctors overall.226 Caps on total damages do not have a statistically
significant effect on the number of doctors.2 27 Nor do changes in the
collateral source rule and other malpractice reforms have statistically
significant effects.228
To analyze the effect of tort reform on health outcomes, Klick and
Stratmann use infant mortality rates by separating white and black infant
mortality rates because of the observed racial disparity in infant mortality.229 Collateral source rule reforms, which were not found to have any
effect on the number of doctors, do seem to be correlated with declining
health outcomes for both whites and blacks. 230 From these regression
results, Klick and Stratmann conclude that the level of care provided
decreases with the passage of collateral source reform.23' While the results
show such decreases, it is hard to explain how the collateral source rule
could have such profound causal effects, particularly given other research
suggesting that prenatal care providers do not seem to respond to liability
reforms in their treatment decisions.232
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Klick and Stratmann also find that non-economic damages caps have
an effect on health outcomes. However, these results are only significant
for black infant mortality rates. 233 Non-economic damages caps are
correlated with reduced black infant mortality in states that adopt such
caps. 234 Taking these results into account alongside the results of the
physician relocation decisions, Klick and Stratmann postulate that blacks
might benefit significantly from the increased access and continuity of care
occasioned by states attracting and retaining doctors through non-economic
damages caps.235
One wonders whether the magnitude of these results may be more a
quirk of the data rather than a basis for drawing causal conclusions. While
infant mortality rates are frequently used as a measure of health outcome,
other dependent variables are perhaps available that could have been
employed to test the robustness of these results. For example, the presence
of chronic conditions might be revealed in surveys, although it is probably
not universally available data. Health-related behaviors and pathologies,
such as smoking or alcohol intake, could also be used in so far as quality
medical care might deter such behaviors.236 However, the authors used
alcohol sales as a control variable, so it would not be available as a
dependent variable.
]II.

CONCLUSION

This brief survey of selected empirical work on the topics of medical
malpractice and tort reform has painted a promising picture of an increasingly sophisticated and relevant body of literature. However, while the
work that is out there is solid, it is but a foundation of the direction
empirical legal scholars can take this area of knowledge. As they move
forward, researchers should bear in mind several of the lessons that can be
learned from a review of existing work.
First, while there are a number of promising projects out there, not
enough people are working in this area. While the "repeat" authors are to
be praised for their diligence and persistence, we need more people working
in this area. Second, the work should better engage other scholarship.
Nearly all of the empirical projects reviewed involved analysis of "original"
233.
Klick & Stratmann, supra note 215, at 17-18.
234.
Id. at 18.
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Id. at 18-19.
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Id. at 9 (using substance use as a control variable; Public Health Agency of
Canada: Division of Childhood and Adolescence. A NationalAssessment of Effects of School
Experiences on Health Outcomes and Behaviour of Children: Technical Report, (using
substance use as a dependent variable), available at http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/dcadea/publications/schobc-esrcscj/iimethod-e.html (last updated Jan. 8, 2004).
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or "novel" data sets; so far, scholars have not been as energetic about
returning to other scholars' data sets to re-test empirical results according to
different model specifications (that is, under different assumptions).
In presenting their results (and in framing their projects), scholars
ought to strive for a bit more caution and a bit less "splash." While the lure
of a press release and attendant attention may be irresistible, empirical legal
scholarship will ultimately have more impact on its target audience (policy
makers, lawyers, and judges) if it recognizes its own limitations.

